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Abstract 
This paper provides a theoretical discussion on the relationship between buoyancy/elas-
ticity and the existence of the underground economy and postulates an inverse relation-
ship between the two. Such relationship is argued because the growth of the under-
ground economy erodes the tax base and consequently reduces receipts, which in turn 
affects revenue productivity. In addition, the paper estimates the size of the underground 
economy in Tanzania for the period 1967-1990 in order to determine the magnitude of 
tax evasion. The resulting estimates show that the size of the underground economy is 
significant and grew from about 10% of official GDP in 1967 to 31% in 1990. These 
estimates suggest that tax evasion in 1990 was equal to more than one-third of total tax 
receipts in that year. The paper also provides an explanatory link between measured 
revenue productivity (buoyancy/elasticity) and tax policies. In this connection, the em-
pirical results suggest that measured productivity is influenced by tax policies in place 
during a specific period. The lower rates/higher buoyancies in the 1970s and the higher 
rates/lower buoyancies in the 1980s demonstrate the laffer curve effect. Finally, the 
paper discusses what type of reforms could penetrate the underground economy. The 
paper concludes with important policy implications for tax reform. 
I. Introduction 
During the last three decades, the tax system of Tanzania has undergone major reform 
(see Osoro, 1991). Invariably, tax reforms have constantly been used to raise the rev-
enue productivity of the tax system. Nevertheless, Osoro (1991) demonstrated that the 
reforms have not achieved the objective of raising revenue productivity. This is evi-
denced by the low buoyancies and the elasticities that the tax system has exhibited over 
the last decade. Such a low revenue productivity of the tax system is argued to have 
been attributable to mainly generous tax exemptions, low compliance and tax evasion 
coming both from a weak tax administration and high tax rates (Osoro 1991). 
One criterion of a good tax system is high revenue productivity. Since the tax 
system is not revenue productive, it is pertinent to link measured productivity with spe-
cific tax policies. This analysis is important because, for example, tax policies and re-
form in the 1970s differed from those of the 1980s (Osoro, 1991, pp. 9-13). Thus, it is 
likely that specific tax policies in a given period might have had different impacts on 
revenue productivity. 
As already pointed out, tax evasion may be considered as one of the factors that is 
likely to have affected revenue productivity. Tax evasion stands out today as one of the 
major problems of the Tanzanian tax system and seems to have been a product of poor 
tax administration, corruption and high tax rates. High tax rates have acted as an incen-
tive to evasion, resulting in a shift in production towards informal sector activities that 
are difficult to tax (Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990). Thus, the existence of the 
underground economy may be considered as a result of high tax rates. 
The objective of this study is fourfold. First, to provide a theoretical discussion on 
the relationship between buoyancy/elasticity and the existence of the underground 
economy. Second, to estimate tax buoyancies and elasticities using official GDP data 
and then using a tax base inclusive of the estimated income from the underground 
economy. Third, as far as possible, to provide an explanatory link between measured 
productivity and tax policies. Finally, to provide a discussion on what type of tax re-
forms could penetrate the underground economy. Section II provides a brief overview 
of tax reform in Tanzania. Section III presents the conceptual framework. Section IV 
discusses methodology, and is followed by a discussion of empirical findings in Section 
V. Section VI discusses the type of reforms that would penetrate the underground 
economy. Summary and concluding remarks are provided in Section VII. 
II. Tax reforms 
Tax reform in Tanzania dates back to the late 1960s. However, major tax reforms started 
in the 1970s. Motivations for tax reform in Tanzania have been due to apparent failure 
of the tax system to generate adequate revenue required to meet growing expenditure 
needs. Rapid growth of expenditure has been caused by socio-economic and political 
developments since the Arusha Declaration of 1967. 
The major objective behind tax reform in the 1960s was revenue and equity. This 
objective was implemented by introduction of a new sales tax in 1969 (Sales Tax Acl, 
1969). Sales tax was introduced partly to offset decline in import duty revenue caused 
by growth in import substitution industries, and partly to reduce rural taxation (Osoro. 
1993). But above all the basic objective was revenue. 
The objectives of tax reform in the 1970s remained revenue and equity, but protec-
tion became increasingly an important objective. The major tax reform in this decade 
was the introduction of a progressive income tax in 1973 (see the Income Tax Act, 1973), 
the repealing of the 1969 Sales Tax Act, replacing it with a new Sales Tax Act of 1976. 
and raising import duty rates, and abolition of excise duty in the late 1970s. The objec-
tive of the first two reforms were to broaden the tax base with a view to raising revenue, 
and achieving equity. The abolition of excise tax resulted in substantial rise in sales tax 
rates to compensate for the resulting revenue loss, and complicated sales tax structure. 
Tax reform in the 1980s was a result of economic crises of that decade. Prior lo 
1985, most tax changes were made on indirect taxation. The rates of import duty and 
sales tax were raised virtually annually, the result of which was an extremely high tax 
rates and a very complicated indirect tax system. 
Following 1985, the country's policies assumed a new dimension. Trade liberal-
ization was put in place. Negotiation with the IMF was concluded in 1986, paving way 
for inflow of foreign sources of finance. In 1985, all export taxes were abolished in 
order to reduce the tax burden on producers and at the same time giving them incentive 
to produce. Thus, the measure was expected to enable the country to sell exports at 
competitive prices (Osoro, 1993). In the same year, the Sales Tax Act, 1976 was amended 
to provide for a "ring" system of sales taxation. A road toll was also introduced. From 
1985 import duty and sales tax rates were gradually reduced each year. Nevertheless, 
significant rate reductions occurred after 1987. Another tax reform was the introduction 
of previously abolished excise duty in 1989 to facilitate rationalization and simplifica-
tion of sales tax structure and administration. Nevertheless, this tax had multiple and 
high rates which was self defeating. 
In the area of income taxation, marginal tax rates were reduced from a range of 25 
to 95% in 1986/87 to 10-50% in 1989. These rate reductions had dual objectives: to 
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reduce the tax burden on a wage earner and to enhance the take home pay of a worker. 
However, the achievement of the second objective was far fetched since the basic pay of 
a worker has been extremely low. 
The tax reforms in the 1990s comprised further reduction of individual income tax 
rates from 10-50% to 7.5-35% in 1992. Further, in 1990 the Investment Promotion Act 
was passed by Parliament to establish the Investment Promotion Center (IPC). The Act 
provided for tax incentives with a view to attracting foreign investments. The tax incen-
tives included among other things, a tax holiday, exemption of taxes on imported inputs. 
If anything, the act has eroded the tax base rather than achieving significant attraction of 
foreign investment. The final tax changes in the 1990s was the reduction of tax rates 
across the board in 1992. Also most tax exemptions were reduced to enhance compli-
ance in the same year. Finally, import duty on imported inputs were removed. Due to 
weak tax administration and corruption, revenue performance was poor. Accordingly, 
exemptions and taxes on inputs which were formally removed were restored after six 
months. As the revenue performance further worsened in 1994 the government raised 
indirect tax rates. 
In summary, the major objectives of tax reform in Tanzania have been revenue, 
equity, and protection. The revenue objective was to be achieved through raising tax 
rates, equity objective by progressive income taxation and high indirect tax rates on 
luxuries, and high import duty rates on imported goods. Nevertheless, apart from mak-
ing efforts to simplify the tax system, the tax reform paid little or no attention to effi-
ciency objective, and reform of tax administration. By and large, tax reform in Tanzania 
has been used as an instrument of raising revenue productivity of the tax system. 
Despite all the reforms described above, Tanzania is still experiencing massive 
revenue shortage leading to large fiscal deficits. Thus tax reforms have not yet suc-
ceeded in raising revenue productivity of the tax system. Several factors have accounted 
for the failure of tax reform to generate adequate revenue: 1). complicated tax structure 
that has prevailed since the 1970s; 2). the granting of generous tax exemptions: statu-
tory and discretionary (by the Minister of Finance and through IPC); 3). high tax rates 
which encourage tax evasion and thereby reducing compliance; and 4). lack of or fail-
ure to undertake reform in tax administration. 
III. Conceptual framework 
Tax evasion 
One of the most important problems that any tax administration faces is cheating or 
evasion. It is important to distinguish between tax avoidance and tax evasion. Tax 
avoidance is changing one's behaviour in such a way as to reduce legal tax liability, and 
as such, tax avoidance is not illegal. Tax evasion is failing to pay taxes which are legally 
due. If a tax on oranges is levied and you sell fewer oranges, it is a tax avoidance. If you 
fail to report your sales of oranges to the tax authorities, it is tax evasion. 
Tax evasion is not a new problem. Even Plato observed, when there is an income 
tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of income (Rosen, 
1985, p. 322). In recent years the phenomenon of tax evasion has received a large amount 
of public attention. However, by its very nature it is difficult to measure. 
The existence of the underground economy is today generally considered a bad 
thing and that policy should be designed to reduce it. While this proposition may be 
correct, it is worth careful scrutiny. 
The crucial issue is whether we care about the welfare of tax evaders. Are the 
utilities of the participants in the underground economy to be included in the social 
welfare function? Assume at the moment that they are. Then, under certain conditions, 
the existence of an underground economy raises social welfare. For instance, if the 
supply of labour is more elastic to the underground economy than the regular economy, 
optimal tax theory suggests that the former be taxed at a relatively low rate, an applica-
tion of inverse elasticity rule. Alternatively, suppose that the participants in the under-
ground economy tend to be poorer than those in the regular economy. Then to the extent 
that the society has egalitarian income redistribution objectives, it might be desirable to 
leave the underground economy intact (Rosen, 1985, p. 327). 
There is no evidence that either of these two assertions is correct. What is impor-
tant to note is that analysis of the usual utilitarian welfare criteria leads to ambiguous 
results in respect of the desirability of an underground economy. 
Consider now the policy implications when evaders are not given weight in the 
social welfare function, and the goal is simply to eliminate cheating at the lowest admin-
istrative cost possible. Further, consider that the expected marginal cost of cheating 
(MC) is the product of the penalty rate (PR) and the probability of detection (p). The 
probability of detection depends upon the amount of resources devoted to tax adminis-
tration. If the Income Tax Department has a big budget, it can catch the cheats. How-
ever, even if the tax authorities have a small budget, so that the probability of detection 
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(p) is low, the marginal cost of cheating can still be made arbitrarily high if the penalty is 
large enough. If only one tax evader were caught each year, but she/he was publicly 
hung for his/her crime, the expected cost of tax evasion would deter many people. Con-
trary to the assumption of the utilitarian framework, society cares not only about the end 
result (i.e., getting rid of cheats), but also the rules by which the results are achieved 
(Rosen, 1985, p. 328) 
The development of the underground economy raises several broader issues for 
society. Some have argued, for instance, that cheating is habit-forming, saying that once 
people become accustomed to evading taxation, they continue to do so, even if marginal 
tax rates are lowered in the future (Lindbeck, 1980). There are also fears that growth of 
the underground economy will force some people into cheating. Suppose, for example, 
the tax evasion becomes predominant in the sectors of the economy dominated by small 
businesses whose activities are particularly difficult to monitor. Then firms that avoid 
cheating will be at a competitive disadvantage because of higher costs. The only choice 
for these firms is to cheat or go out of business. 
To date, there has not been a single study on tax evasion in Tanzania. Nevertheless, 
there are clear indications that tax evasion exists and is a big problem in the country's tax 
system. To appreciate the seriousness of the problem it is worth citing a few tax evasion 
cases. In November 1991, a Dar-es-Salaam based company was given seven months to 
pay Tsh 452.7 million as customs and sales tax it had been evading since the firm was set 
up in 1989. The firm, which is a clearing and forwarding company, obtained fake docu-
ments showing that they made 91 business trips to Zambia via Tunduma border post, 
between 1989 and June 1991 while in fact only six trips were made. Further investiga-
tions carried out in Zambia revealed that the firm was accustomed to shoddy deals as 
officials there proved that all the documents used to cross the border were fake. The 
Minister for Home Affairs, by then Mr. Augustine Mrema, remarked: "This company 
seems to have specifically been established to swindle the Government" (Daily News, 
15 November, 1991). The minister further said the company was alleged to have made 
70 trips to Burundi and Rwanda, but records showed no single truck of containers had 
crossed to the neighbouring countries. On the contrary, the firm had its documents ille-
gally stamped at Mrusagambwa border post in Ngara District. 
On 25 November, 1991 another Dar-es-Salaam based - private company was dis-
covered to have evaded taxes amounting to Tshs.85 million over the last two years. The 
firm was also a clearing and forwarding company. Accordingly, Minister Mrema noted 
that "tax evasion was a virus that would wreck the national economy unless drastic 
measures were taken to patch existing loopholes" (Daily News, November 15, 1991). 
Apart from these two tax evasion cases, many others were unearthed during 1991. 
However, most of the cases involved evasion of indirect taxes (sales tax and import 
duty). Very few cases have involved income tax. This is because direct taxes are easier 
to evade than indirect taxes. 
Personal income tax rates in Tanzania have been generally progressive and rela-
tively high, ranging from 20-95% during the 1973-74 to 1984-85 period. For example, 
in 1981, a person earning a monthly income of Tshs4,000 paid a quarter of his income as 
tax, while one earning Tshs25,000 paid three-quarters of his earnings as tax. Since 1986, 
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however, there have been gradual attempts by the government to reduce personal in-
come tax rates. As a result, from June 1992, the marginal personal income tax rates have 
ranged from 5 to 35% (Budget Speech 1992-93). 
Cheating may be habit-forming, that is, once people become accustomed to evad-
ing taxation, they will continue to do so even if the marginal tax rates are lowered. In the 
face of this, there is no guarantee that the now existing low rates will significantly dis-
courage incentives to evade income tax. Since the probability of being detected is small 
and the penalty rate is still low, evasion of income tax is likely to continue. 
Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) contend that due to the existing inefficiency 
of many industries in Tanzania, the tax rate per product is higher than net profit rates per 
item. This acts, therefore, as an incentive to evade taxes to offset business losses and/or 
reap illegitimate profits. They further argue that, generally, high tax rates combined 
with deteriorating economic situations have tended to shift production towards those 
activities that are difficult to bring to the tax net (i.e., informal sector activities). In this 
connection, one can argue that the emergence of the underground economy has partly 
been a consequence of tax evasion. 
It is noteworthy that tax evasion is not the only factor that has adversely affected 
tax collection in Tanzania. The government participation in economic activity in the 
economy, since the Arusha Declaration of 1967 is one of the major factors that have also 
contributed to low tax collections. Public participation in the economy in form of parastatal 
enterprises, most of which operated inefficiently, and hence fall in production resulted in 
low tax collection of commodity taxes (sales tax and excise duty) and company taxes. 
However, this paper concentrates on loss of revenue arising from tax evasion. 
Buoyancy/elasticity and the existence of the under-
ground economy 
High tax rates are considered to be one of the major incentives to evade taxes. The 
underground economy has thus partly been used as a vehicle for evading tax. The imme-
diate impact of tax evasion is the erosion of a country's tax base. Since income elasticity 
of a tax is a product of base-to-income elasticity and tax-to-base elasticity, reduction of 
the tax base is bound to reduce the overall income elasticity of a tax. Likewise, erosion 
of tax base may lead to reduced tax buoyancy. Thus, the relationship between tax buoy-
ancy and fee existence of a parallel economy is an indirect but important one. 
Accordingly, it is pertinent to postulate that there is an inverse relationship be-
tween buoyancy/elasticity and the existence of an underground economy. That is, as the 
size of the parallel economy rises, the tax buoyancy/elasticity are expected to fall, and 
vice versa. This is because when the size of the underground economy is large, unre-
ported economic activities will escape taxation (through tax evasion) consequently eroding 
the tax base. The final impact of the reduced base is a low base-to-income elasticity, one 
of the two components of the income elasticity of a tax. Buoyancy and elasticity are 
often measured with respect to official GDP. This is fine as long as the size of the 
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underground economy is insignificant. However, in a situation where the size of the 
underground economy is large, buoyancy and elasticity estimates based on official GDP 
data may be overstated. 
Thus, it is interesting to estimate tax elasticity using official data and then using a 
tax base inclusive of the estimated income from the underground economy. It is ex-
pected that the estimates based on the latter will tend to be lower than those based on 
official data. Consequently, the measurement of the underground economy is warranted. 
Measurement of the underground economy 
Consensus has not yet been reached regarding the measurement of the underground 
economy, although some progress has been made. Researchers have developed several 
alternative techniques to its measurements. Some have attempted a direct measurement 
of various activities that constitute the phenomenon (Simon and Witte, 1980). Some 
have carried out field surveys to elicit answers from persons interviewed as to whether 
they have participated in these activities either as buyers or sellers (Isachsen, Kloveland, 
ami Strom, 1982; Hanson, 1982); Some have utilized labour statistics to estimate the 
number of those who were actually working 'underground' (Petteneti, 1979; Contini, 
1982). Others have estimated the underground economy from differences between the 
consumption and income outside the national accounts (Macafee, 1980). Others have 
used the information on income and consumption contained in household budget studies 
(Dilnot and Morris, 1982). Yet others have used the monetary approach (Guttman, 1977; 
Frige, 1979,1986; Tanzi, 1983; and Bhattacharyya 1990). Of great interest to this study 
is the monetary approach. 
The monetary approach 
This approach, which was suggested by Guttman (1977) and Feige (1979) is based on a 
modified version of Cagan (1953). Tanzi (1983) is a sophisticated variant of the mon-
etary approach. The monetary approach argues that in order to avoid government detec-
tion, all underground economic activities avoid the use of cheques or credit cards and 
rely on currency for transactions. To this effect, relative changes in currency holdings 
are construed as reflecting volume movements in the underground economy activities. 
Tanzi (1983) distinguishes three variants of this approach: 
1. the currency-equation variant; 
2. the currency-denomination variant; and 
3. the fixed-ratio variant. 
The currency-denomination variant rests on the premise that the underground activities 
are characterized by the use of large bills of certain denominations. Thus, by analyzing 
the change in the composition of total currency holdings in circulation, some analysts 
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have attempted to measure the underground economy (Henry, 1975). 
The currency-denomination approach is subject to criticism. With real growth and 
relatively high growth rates of inflation, it would be expected that the composition of 
currency holdings would change over the years. 
The fixed-ratio variant rests on two key assumptions. First, it assumes that there is 
a monetary ratio that, except for the effect of the underground economy, would have 
remained constant over time. Second, it assumes that there was a golden period in the 
past when no underground economy existed. This monetary ratio is C/D for Gutmann 
(1977) and MV/GNP for Feige (1979), where C is currency in circulation, D is demand 
deposits, M is money supply (currency plus demand deposits), V is transactions (not 
income) velocity of money, and GNP is the official estimated gross national product. 
Through the changes over time in these ratios, Guttman and Feige estimate the size of 
the underground economy. Guttman's method is an indirect one since he first calculates 
'excessive' currency in circulation (induced by the existence of underground economy). 
In contrast, Feige's method is direct, as the change in MV/GNP ratio over time allows a 
direct estimation of underground economy. The golden period, when the underground 
economy was zero is the late 1930s for Guttman and either the late 1930s or mid-1960s 
for Feige. 
Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) applied Guttman's approach to estimate the 
size of the underground economy in Tanzania. They estimated it at 31.4% of the offi-
cially estimated GNP in 1986. They also used this method to estimate the annual size of 
the underground economy for the 1977-86 period. Maliyamkono and Bagachwa further 
assert that, between 1978 and 1986, the second economy has been growing rapidly at an 
annual rate of 30.1% compared to 19.4% annual growth in official GNP statistics. Thus, 
they conclude that, it seems, therefore, that during the slowdown in economic activity of 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, the second economy has picked up rather rapidly 
(Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990 p. 45). 
Maliyamkono and Bagachwa warn that these results should be interpreted with 
care. First, the assumption that transactions in the second economy are strictly paid for 
by currency alone introduces a downward bias in the estimates. Second, the monetary 
approach to the measurement of the underground economy does not calculate values for 
transactions involving barter exchange and where goods are exchanged for foreign money. 
Third, the choice of an appropriate bench-mark period, where the ratio of currency to 
demand deposits is assumed to be 'normal', entails an element of arbitrariness. Finally, 
an increase in the C/D cannot be attributed solely to a rise in currency. It can also result 
from a decline in the demand deposits. 
The currency-equation variant estimates the effect of a change in the variable that 
influences the informal behaviour of economic agents on the demand for currency. From 
the currency equation, the size of the underground economy can be estimated, within the 
assumption that currency is used primarily in underground economy transactions. 
Tanzi (1983) used the currency-equation variant to derive annual estimates of the 
underground economy in the United States for the 1930-80 period. He used these esti-
mates in turn to compute the magnitude of tax evasion. 
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Tanzi's article has not been ignored by economists interested in measuring the 
underground economy. His article has been criticized by Acharya (1984), Feige (1986), 
Thomas (1986), and Zilberfarb (1986). The criticisms they leveled against Tanzi are on 
methodological issues and empirical results. In response, Tanzi discredits virtually all 
the comments on his article and considers the issues raised unfounded. The only com-
ment that Tanzi appreciates is that by Zilberfarb on the application of an upper-bound 
limit to Tanzi's estimates. Zilberfarb applies this approach to re-estimate Tanzi's results 
using the marginal tax rate as opposed to the average tax rate that Tanzi used. 
Bhattacharyya (1990) estimated the 'hidden economy' in the United Kingdom us-
ing quarterly data for the 1960-84 period. He applied econometric method to these data. 
Bhattacharyya estimated the omitted part of the GDP (or GNP) that is reflected by the 
currency in circulation to public. The approach that he used is similar to some of the 
earlier studies on the estimation of 'tax-evaded income' through currency-demand equa-
tion. However, the detailed treatment and modeling strategy is different. The salient 
feature of this approach is that it deviates from the existing literature since it uses ob-
served variables for extracting information. Unlike Tanzi (1983) or Kloveland (1984), 
Bhattacharyya does not estimate the 'hidden economy' using tax variables. Thus he 
argues that the estimates obtained using his method have the advantage of testing theo-
ries of tax evasion without being conditioned by the variable under test. 
Invariably, Bhattacharyya's method seems to be superior to the method used by 
Tanzi (1983). Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the econometric model that he uses in 
estimating the hidden economy requires time series data of at least 50 observations, to 
obtain meaningful results. In many developing countries, lack of long time series data is 
a common problem and Tanzania is no exception. In the face of this, although attractive, 
the method could not be applied to Tanzanian data to obtain meaningful econometric 
results. 
IV. Methodology 
Measurement of the underground economy 
Two methods are used to estimate the underground economy in this study, namely, Tanzi's 
currency-demand equation approach, and Guttman's currency-ratio approach. Both 
methods have been discussed in Section II. 
The Tanzi approach 
The Tanzi approach has one advantage in that monetary data in most developing coun-
tries, including Tanzania, is the most reliable within official statistics. By and large, 
most informal economy activities, legal and illegal (but particularly the illegal ones), use 
currency to conceal records of the transactions. Likewise, where illegality is explicit (or 
even implied transactions are effected with intention of avoiding tax collectors) transac-
tions are done predominantly in cash. 
The approach specifies a demand for currency equation to be able to infer the effect 
of change in the tax level on that demand. The key assumptions are: 1). that under-
ground economic activities are the direct consequence of high taxes'; thus estimates will 
not capture these activities. Computation, however, excludes the income generated from 
illegal activities from national accounts; it is likely that this income would vanish if it 
would be discovered and taxed. It should also be noted that the opportunity cost of the 
resources used for these activities is likely to be very low; and 2). that currency is used 
mainly for carrying out such transactions or for storing wealth. In the equation, the ratio 
of currency holdings (C) to money (defined as M2) is the dependent variable. The inde-
pendent variables are real per capita income (Y), the rate of interest paid on time depos-
its (R), the ratio of wages and salaries to national income (WS/NI), and an income tax 
variable (T). Thus: 
ln(C/M2) = a 0 + a,lnT + a2ln(WS/NI) + a 3lnR + a 4lnY + e (1) 
where e is an error term. 
The direct application of Tanzi's currency-demand equation variant to Tanzanian data to 
estimate the underground economy may be inappropriate. Thus the necessity to modify 
the model is warranted. Accordingly, a slight modification was made on Equation (1). 
Since the rate of interest has been virtually constant from 1967 to 1980, the interest 
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variable was removed from the equation and replaced by an inflation variable. With this 
modification, the currency-demand equation becomes: 
ln(C/M2) = B0 + 6,lnT + B2ln(WS/NI) + 6 3lnY + J34ln p + e (2) 
where e is an error term and ( p ) is the annual rate of inflation. 
Once Equation (2) has been estimated for the period 1967-89, it can be utilized to esti-
mate currency holdings by making the assumption that the tax variable assumes a zero 
value. Once currency holdings at zero taxes are estimated, they can be used to determine 
the extent of the underground economy by multiplying excessive currency by the in-
come velocity of money.2 
The Guttman approach 
The Guttman approach, typically a variant of the general 'monetary approach' as dis-
cussed earlier, is based on the currency-demand deposit ratios (as opposed to the regres-
sion approach using the currency-total money ratio). The details of the approach will go 
hand in hand with computations. Thus this is left to the empirical findings section (see 
Section IV). 
Measured productivity and tax policies 
The common measures of revenue productivity of a tax are buoyancy and elasticity. Tax 
elasticity is a measure of the responsiveness of tax receipts to economic growth. If a tax 
is elastic, a 1 % increase in national income or output results in a greater than 1 % increase 
in revenue from the tax. It is necessary when estimating tax elasticity to control for 
exogenous influences such as discretionary changes in tax policies, because tax receipts 
may increase due to seasons other than economic growth. In contrast, tax buoyancy is a 
measure of the responsiveness of tax receipts to economic growth plus tax structure. In 
other words, tax buoyancy is a measure of the responsiveness of tax receipts to eco-
nomic growth without controlling for discretionary changes in tax policy.3 
In determining whether measured productivity is linked to specific tax policies, 
estimates of buoyancies and elasticities of the tax system are undertaken for two sepa-
rate periods: 1969-70 to 1979-80 and 1980-81 to 1989-90. This is done as tax policies 
in the 1970s differed from those of the 1980s (Osoro, 1991, pp. 10-16). The higher 
values of buoyancies and elasticities imply that the policies in a specific period were 
effective in raising revenue productivity. Since there have been many tax policy reforms 
during the two decades, there is a need to estimate intertemporal tax elasticities. 
Most studies of tax elasticities in developing countries implicitly assume constant 
tax elasticities over time by their assumption of double-log-tax functions of the form: 
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InT = a o + a, lnY + e (3) 
where a{ is the constant elasticity, T is the tax revenue, and Y is income. 
Other functional forms for the tax function would admit increasing or declining 
intertemporal tax elasticities. 
In order to allow for the possibility of changing tax elasticities over time, a model 
suggestion by Box and Cox (1964) is often used.4 If T j t is revenue from the ith tax in 
period t and Y t is gross domestic production in time t, then the model is: 
T ^ a . + a t f + e , , (4) 
where e.. is a random disturbance and: 
r* JOt f - 1 ) ' 1 f°r i = 0 
1 lnyit for i = 0 
and: 
M i = 0 
1 Inyit for / = 0 
If the transformation parameter, X. equals one, the model takes the linear form: 
= a o + a i ^ i t + eii. (5) 
While if X equals zero, the model takes on the traditional double log form: 
lnT i t = a 0 + a 1lnY i t + e i t (6) 
Other values of X l e a d t o alternative nonlinear tax equations. The tax elasticities de-
pend on the values of the coefficient of the income variable, a, and on the transformation 
parameter, 1. For the ith tax the elasticity is given by: 
^ ( Y . ^ A (7) 
In the special case when the transformation parameter equals zero and the tax function 
takes on the double-log form, the elasticity reduces to al and is constant over time. 
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When 1 is different from zero, the elasticity depends on the ratio Y i t/T i t which may vary 
over time causing intertemporal variations in the elasticity. Once the intertemporal elas-
ticities have been estimated they are related to the corresponding tax policies in specific 
years. This facilitates the analysis of the explanatory link between measured productiv-
ity and specific tax policies. 
V. The results 
Regression results of currency-equation approach 
It is pertinent to point out at the outset that this paper does not assume that underground 
activity is a function of just tax evasion. Underground activity is also a function of 
income transfers, regulation, licensing barriers and controls. However, the paper has 
focused mainly on tax evasion as one of the main factors influencing underground activ-
ity. 
Utilizing the data in Table 1, Equation (2) was estimated. A logarithmic specifica-
tion has been used; given that specification, to solve the equation, variable (T) has been 
replaced in each case by the yearly figures shown in the table plus one. In other words, 
T has been replaced for each year by (1 + T). The fitting of Tanzi's Equation (2) did not 
provide a good fit and therefore no attempt was made to estimate the size of the under-
ground economy using it. Accordingly, the Guttman approach was used to estimate the 
size of the underground economy. 
Results obtained from Guttman's approach 
Guttman's approach can be used to generate rough estimates of the overall size of the 
underground economy activities by tracing movements in the ratio of currency in circu-
lation to demand deposits, as outlined earlier. Thus, it is assumed that 1977 was the year 
characterized by a 'normal' ratio of currency to demand deposits. That is, underground 
economy activities were insignificant in that year. In addition, this was also a year 
which exhibited the lowest currency-demand deposits ratio. Also, it was a boom year.5 
It is initially assumed that the cash-demand deposits ratio (C/D) of 59% associated with 
the year 1977 would have prevailed were it not for the growth of the underground economy. 
The ratio has increased slowly but steadily since then (see Table 2). 
The following formula was used to estimate the size of underground economy: 
UECON = E F E C 0 N .[M, - DD.(l + C / DD).„ 7 71 (8) DD. (1 + C / DDx911 ) 1 V ; , 9 7 7 j 
where UECON is underground economy, EFECON is official (GDP) economy, C 
Table 1: Tanzania: Basic data, 1967-89 
Year Currency M2 1976 shillings per Wages and salary Savings,deposits Time deposits Average rate 
capital (Y) national income Interest rates interest rates of income tax 
Shillings Million % 
1967 511.70 1539.70 15145.00 18.54 4.25 4.25 3.67 
1968 528.60 1813.80 15939.00 18.32 3.50 4.25 4.50 
1969 605.00 2193.90 16301.00 18.56 3.50 4.25 4.41 
1970 818.40 2336.20 16945.00 18.28 3.50 4.25 4.93 
1971 986.40 2732.00 17542.00 17.95 3.50 •4.25 5.47 
1972 1201.10 3178.40 18664.00 16.84 3.50 4.25 5.37 
1973 1198.60 3702.30 19167.00 18.76 4.00 4.25 5.97 
1974 1517.30 4519.10 19411.00 22.94 4.00 4.25 8.13 
1975 1755.80 5616.50 20407.00 18.99 4.00 4.25 7.28 
1976 2071.30 6946.80 21652.00 15.16 4.00 4.25 7.36 
1977 2379.70 8346.70 21739.00 14.26 4.00 5.25 7.41 
1978 2915.20 9396.30 22202.00 14.17 5.00 5.50 7.51 
1979 4055.40 13806.60 22849.00 15.55 5.00 5.50 8.48 
1980 5245.40 17519.90 23419.00 14.84 5.00 5.50 8.29 
1981 6616.00 20694.70 23301.00 13.65 6.00 6.25 8.34 
1982 7988.00 24728.60 23439.00 14.05 7.50 7.13 8.18 
1983 8194.20 29127.40 22882.00 12.43 7.50 7.50 7.50 
1984 10472.40 30218.10 23656.00 9.91 7.50 7.50 7.17 
1985 12719.00 38971.00 24278.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 7.09 
1986 18309.70 50353.40 25070.00 6.86 10.00 10.00 6.22 
1987 24550.80 66442.90 26345.00 5.26 21.50 21.25 6.89 
1988 31702.30 89809.10 27460.00 4.01 21.59 21.25 7.27 
1989 41094.80 116295.20 28376.00 3.54 26.00 23.00 7.72 
Source:Bank of Tanzania, Economic and Operations Report (various years), URT, Economic Survey (various years), URT, Financial Statement 
and Revenue Estimates (various years). Figures in columns 5 and 8 computed by author. 
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about 10% in 1967, possibly owing to the pronouncement of the Arusha Declaration 
which gave rise to different expectations regarding the future economy (Table 2). There-
after, the proportion declined rapidly until 1969. From 1970 the underground economy 
grew rapidly, reaching the highest level of about one-quarter of the official economy in 
1972. This was possibly attributable to the nationalization policy of 1972. Since the 
policy discouraged private investment in the manufacturing sector and construction, those 
people who were capable of investing had to resort to holding cash in their homes. 
The years 1973 and 1974 registered the size of the underground economy at about 
9 to 10%, respectively. However, the 1974-77 period saw a rapid decline in the size of 
the underground economy. In general, the second half of the 1970s was relatively a good 
period. The country was already recovering from the first oil price shock of 1973-74, 
and the underground economy declined until the Uganda War in 1978. After the Uganda 
War the size of the underground economy dropped to 2.6% in 1980. Thereafter it grew 
rapidly, reaching 11% in 1982. By 1982, economic conditions had worsened. This led 
to a crackdown on economic saboteurs by the government on 25 March, 1983. The key 
person in implementing the crackdown was the late Prime Minister Moringe Sokoine, 
who died on 12 April, 1983. After his death the size of the underground economy esca-
lated, to 27% in that same year. The underground economy then grew gradually, reach-
ing about 31% in 1987. The Economic Recovery Programme period has seen a slightly 
declining trend in the growth of the underground economy, although the annual levels 
still remain high. 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that despite the improvement in the economy 
that resulted from changes in policy, the size of the underground economy has not de-
clined. Instead it has grown, for which there are a couple of explanations. 
The underground economy may be said to consist of three activities: 
1. The parallel market which comprises mainly rent seeking activities; 
2. The black market comprising smuggled goods and currency; and 
3. The informal sector. 
Due to government intervention (i.e., through price controls, etc.) parallel market activi-
ties have substantially declined. For example, the difference between the price of grains 
in the official market and the parallel market is now very small. The black market, 
unlike the parallel market, is still thriving and is possibly growing. This is evidenced by 
the fact that the volume of own-funded imports has been growing. Finally, informal 
sector activities have been growing rapidly. The streets of Dar-es-Salaam city centre are 
occupied by informal traders whose number grows daily. In the face of growing black 
market and informal sector activities, the size of the underground economy would not be 
expected to decline. 
Table 2: Tanzania: Monetary data, underground economy arid tax evasion, 1967-90 
Year Currency Demand Nominal M1 Underground Tax Currency- Average Underground 
deposits GDP 
Shillings million 
economy evasion deposits tax rate 
% 
economy as 
% of GDP 
1967 511.70 680.40 6735.00 1192.10 665.67 17.79 75.21 2.67 9.88 
1968 528.60 768.80 7182.00 1297.00 417.01 58.03 68.76 13.92 5.81 
1969 605.00 931.80 7460.00 1536.80 256.47 40.54 64.93 15.81 3.44 
1970 818.40 977.10 8215.00 1795.50 1252.59 208.01 83.76 16.61 15.25 
1971 986.40 1179.60 8857.00 2166.00 1342.89 296.72 83.62 22.10 15.16 
1972 1201.10 1214.40 10032.00 2415.00 2482.63 476.83 98.90 19.21 24.75 
1973 1198.60 1625.40 11490.00 2824.00 1030.16 233.86 73.74 22.70 8.97 
1974 1517.30 1996.10 14010.00 3513.40 1455.67 350.48 76.01 24.08 10.39 
1975 1755.80 2591.80 16988.00 4347.60 884.10 178.04 67.74 20.14 5.20 
1976 2071.30 3260.50 21652.00 5313.80 554.13 121.50 63.53 21.93 2.56 
1977 2379.70 4003.10 25698.00 6382.80 0.00 0.00 59.45 21.25 0.00 
1978 2915.20 3911.70 28582.00 6825.90 2702.98 560.31 74.53 20.73 9.46 
1979 4055.40 6380.00 32317.00 10435.10 834.62 176.01 63.56 21.09 2.58 
1980 5245.40 8100.00 37454.00 13345.90 1249.15 271.44 64.76 21.73 3.34 
1981 6616.00 8785.20 43906.00 15401.20 4367.86 917.15 75.31 21.00 9.95 
1982 7988.00 10334.50 52546.00 18323.10 5884.12 1248.32 77.29 21.22 11.20 
1983 8194.20 12370.10 62608.00 20564.20 2668.03 581.91 66.24 21.81 4.26 
1984 10472.40 10064.70 78143.00 20537.10 21860.14 4854.17 104.05 22.21 27.97 
1985 12719.00 12551.70 108083.00 25270.70 28393.34 5263.45 101.33 18.54 26.27 
1986 18309.70 17499.80 140866.00 35808.50 39916.59 8368.33 104.63 20.96 28.34 
1987 24550.80 22550.80 200377.00 47101.60 62109.43 13347.25 108.87 21.49 31.00 
1988 31702.30 33698.00 285152.00 65000.30 59811.34 14588.81 94.08 24.39 20.98 
1989 41094.80 41323.90 335505.00 82418.70 84165.81 21029.07 99.45 24.99 25.09 
1990 57919.10 53165.80 401583.00 111084.90 124656.28 36708.42 108.94 29.45 31.04 
Source: Bank of Tanzania, Economic and Operations Report (various years), Bureau of Statistics (1991), Tanzania Selected Statistical Series; 
1951-88, UTR, Financial Statement and Revenue Estimates (various years.) 
Note: Columns 8-10 computed using basic data in columns 2-5. 
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Yet another explanation for the continued growth of the underground economy 
relates to high tax rates and depreciation of the shilling. While the government has made 
efforts to reduce tax rates since 1985, these efforts have been offset by the depreciation 
of the shilling, leading to a high tax bill paid on imported commodities. In such a situa-
tion, one would not expect the underground economy to decline. Also, to engage in 
underground economic activities is a habit-forming; like tax evasion, once people be-
come accustomed to it, they continue even if conditions improve. 
Tax evasion 
Estimating tax evasion requires knowledge of the size of the underground economy which 
has already been computed. The underground economy grew from Tshs2.7 billion in 
1978 to about Tshsl2.5 billion in 1989 (Table 2). As a proportion of GDP, the under-
ground economy was around one-quarter of official GDP in 1989, compared to 9.5% 
and 9.0% in 1978 and 1967, respectively. For the period under consideration, 1967-90, 
the underground economy averaged around 14% of official GDP. 
Tax evasion is estimated at Tshs.37 billion in 1989 compared to Tshs0.56 billion in 
1978 and TshsO.Ol billion in 1967 (see Table 2, column 9). These figures assume that 
incomes, goods and services in the underground economy would have been taxed at the 
same average rate as incomes in the regular economy. This is obviously a strong as-
sumption. If incomes in the underground economy had been marginal incomes, and thus 
would have been taxed at marginal tax rates, the estimates of tax evasion would have 
been much higher. This is definitely true for the providers of underground services. 
They may hold regular jobs or participate in regular activities on which they pay normal 
taxes, and may provide underground services during weekends or evenings. Thus, if 
they had declared these additional incomes or tax base, they would have paid higher 
taxes than they actually paid on their reported incomes or tax liability. Many of the 
participants in the underground economy may not declare any income or tax liability at 
all. Furthermore, some of these activities might not take place at all if they could be 
controlled and taxed. 
To conclude, without ascertaining each activity and consequently determining 
whether the activity would exist if it had to move above ground, it is extremely difficult 
to establish what the exact loss in tax revenue from the underground activities would be. 
Thus the assumption that has been made probably yields the most reasonable estimates 
that can be made in view of the information available.6 
Buoyancies and elasticity estimates 
Tax buoyancies and elasticities are estimated using official GDP statistics and then using 
the tax base figures inclusive of the estimated income from the underground economy. 
Historical tax revenue series were refined using the Prest (1962) method to obtain ad-
justed series which were subsequently used in estimating tax elasticities. 
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Buoyancy estimates 
Table 3 compares buoyancy estimates based on official GDP with those based on tax 
inclusive of the estimated income from the underground economy. When official GDP 
is used to estimate buoyancies, total taxes, sales tax and import duty exhibited buoyan-
cies greater than one (Table 3). However, when the estimated underground income is 
included in the tax base, the buoyancy estimates decline. In other words, the use of 
official data tends to overestimate the buoyancies. On the average the overestimation is 
around 9%. 
Elasticity estimates 
Table 4 compares elasticity estimates based on the official GDP with those based on the 
tax base inclusive of the estimated income from the underground economy. As in the 
case of buoyancy estimates, the use of official GDP to estimate elasticities tends towards 
overestimation. 
Measured productivity and tax policies 
In Section I it was argued that there is a possible link between tax revenue productivity 
and specific tax policies. As pointed out, tax policies in the 1970s differed somewhat 
from those in the 1980s. The 1970s saw the introduction of the Income Tax Act, 1973 
and the introduction of tax by the Sales Tax Act, 1976. The objectives of tax policy in 
the 1970s were revenue and equity. However, tax rates in this decade had not been 
raised to the extent of discouraging compliance. In addition, corruption and the exist-
ence of the underground economy had not yet become significant. Combined, these led 
to good tax compliance, which possibly enhanced high tax buoyancies and elasticities. 
The 1980s was a decade of economic crises. The crises intensified when the gov-
ernment attempts to negotiate with the IMF failed. Thus, the government had no option 
but to rely on domestic sources of finance. To redress balance of payments deficits, 
trade restrictions and exchange control were strongly enforced by the government to 
limit the importation of foreign goods. Hence, tax reform before 1985 involved raising 
the rates of import duty and sales tax with a view to increasing revenue to reduce the 
fiscal deficits. For example, import duty rates on some products were as high as 1000%! 
The scope of tax exemptions widened during the 1980s. Serious rationalization of 
sales tax and import duty rates started in the fiscal year 1988-89. The tax policies in the 
decade were characterized by high tax rates and generous exemptions. The former pos-
sibly resulted in low compliance and hence tax evasion, which was carried out through 
underground activities. Above all, high tax rates and generous exemptions must have 
eroded the tax base, thereby reducing buoyancies and elasticities. Table 5 compares 
elasticities of taxes in the 1970s with those in the 1980s. The total tax system, including 
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Table 3: Buoyancy estimates, 1978-89 
A B Difference in 
percentage points 
Total taxes 1.0632 0.9739 8.3992 
Income tax 0.9468 0.8547 9.7275 
Company tax 0.9999 0.9017 9.8210 
PAYE 0.7280 0.6618 9.0934 
Sales tax 1.0148 0.9213 9.2136 
Import duty 1.2673 1.1440 9.7293 
Notes: A = based on official GDP; B = based on tax base inclusive of estimated income from the 
underground economy. 
Table 4: Elasticity estimates, 1978-89 
A B Difference in 
percentage points 
Total taxes 0.8171 0.7387 9.5949 
Income tax 1.0394 0.9397 9.5992 
Company tax 0.9999 0.9017 9.8210 
PAYE 0.7280 0.6618 9.0934 
Sales tax 0.7278 0.6602 9.2988 
Import duty 0.7667 0.6837 10.8256 
Notes: A = based on official GDP; B = based on tax base inclusive of estimated income from the 
underground economy. 
income tax and sales tax, was buoyant in the 1970s, with the exception of import duty. 
The low buoyancy of import duty can partly be explained by the import restriction 
measures instituted in the early 1970s. Import duty which was not buoyant in the 1970s 
became buoyant in the 1980s. However, this growth in elasticity was offset by a dra-
matic decline in buoyancy in respect to income tax (-35%) and sales tax (-45%) in the 
1980s. The lower rates and higher buoyancy in the 1970s and higher rates and lower 
buoyancy of the 1980s demonstrate the Laffer Curve effect. The tax rate-tax revenue 
relationship is known as the Laffer Curve. If a tax is gradually increased from zero up to 
a point where it becomes prohibitive, its yield is at first nil, then increases by small 
stages until it reaches a maximum, after which it gradually declines until it becomes zero 
again. However, there is popular debate surrounding the Laffer Curve, which is yet to 
clarify certain elements of it. Table 6 compares elasticities of taxes in the 1970s with the 
1980s. The elasticity of the tax system has declined from 0.85 in the 1970s to 0.782 in 
the 1980s - a decline of around 8 percent. Further, income tax and sales tax which were 
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Table 5: Comparison of buoyancy estimates, 1970s-1980s 
1970s 1980s Difference in 
percentage points 
Total taxes 1.1063 1.0430 -5.7218 
Income tax 1.4147 0.9175 -35.1453 
Sales tax 1.6349 0.9019 -44.8345 
Import duty 0.5431 0.3734 154.8816 
Table 6: Comparison of elasticity estimates, 1970s-1980s 
1970s 1980s Percentage change 
Total taxes 0.8838 0.7820 -8.4095 
Income tax 1.4406 0.6306 -56.2266 
Sales tax 1.3129 0.6721 -48.8080 
Import duty 0.2812 1.1827 +320.5903 
elastic in the 1970s became inelastic in the 1980s. Finally, import duty, which was 
considerably inelastic in the 1970s, became elastic in the 1980s. 
What was the reason for large changes in the buoyancy and elasticity of import 
duty in the 1980s? The changes were a result of a reduction of import duty rates and 
rates categories, change from specific to ad valorem rates combined with a rise in im-
ports (following the liberalization of 1984) and most importantly, rapid changes in the 
valuation base resulting from steep exchange rate depreciation which started from June 
1986. 
The ongoing analysis demonstrates that the general low buoyancies and elasticities 
of the total tax, income tax and sales tax reflect tax policies which were in place in the 
1980s. 
Tax policies and intertemporal elasticity 
Table 7 provides the estimates of intertemporal elasticity for the 1969-1990 period. The 
estimates were derived from estimating a Box-Cox Model.7 In respect to the total tax 
system, the general trend of intertemporal elasticities has been a rising one, though the 
rise is quite small. With income tax, intertemporal elasticities have been constant and 
unitary during the years before 1973, the year the Income Tax Act was legislated. From 
1973 the elasticities were less than unity and declined gradually to 0.91% in 1979. From 
1986 the government gradually reduced the income tax rates. This seems to have slightly 
improved the elasticities in the subsequent years. The intertemporal elasticities of sale 
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Table 7: Box-Cox intertemporal elasticities 
Year Total tax Income tax Sales tax Import duty 
1969 0.727 1.051 0.835 0.288 
1970 0.725 1.036 0.836 0.305 
1971 0.696 1.004 0.833 0.323 
1972 0.719 1.008 0.842 0.329 
1973 0.712 0.986 0.841 0.302 
1974 0.708 0.924 0.854 0.335 
1975 0.738 0.946 0.846 0.486 
1976 0.741 0.960 0.835 0.625 
1977 0.741 0.951 0.831 0.388 
1978 0.740 0.916 0.837 0.406 
1979 0.763 0.911 0.837 0.638 
1980 0.760 0.914 0.830 0.393 
1981 0.769 0.913 0.837 1.185 
1982 0.762 0.916 0.838 0.855 
1983 0.778 0.974 0.838 1.359 
1984 0.779 0.962 0.833 0.917 
1985 0.802 0.974 0.821 1.093 
1986 0.802 0.994 0.818 0.800 
1987 0.795 0.974 0.822 0.796 
1988 0.801 1.035 0.819 0.877 
1989 0.800 1.007 0.807 0.743 
1990 0.778 0.957 0.812 0.669 
Source: Osoro, N.E, and Jane H. Leuthold, "Changing Tax Elasticities: The Case of Tanzania", 
mimeo. 
tax, introduced in 1969, were somewhat constant during the 1969-1984 period. This 
was the period in which the sales tax rates were constantly being raised to collect more 
revenue. From 1984, the government started to reduce sales tax rates and serious ratio-
nalization of sales tax started in 1988. However, this does not seem to have improved 
the elasticities. The failure might have probably been due to tax evasion. 
Unlike total tax, income tax and sales tax, the intertemporal elasticities of import 
duty have varied during 1969-74. The elasticity has been considerably low and constant 
at around 0.3%. In the year of the coffee boom (1976) elasticity rose to 0.6%. Since then 
the intertemporal elasticities have fluctuated significantly. Since 1985, that is after im-
port/trade liberalization, the intertemporal elasticities have been relatively high, although 
the trend is to decline. Such a declining trend seems to have been attributable to the 
apparent tax evasion. 
It is apparent from the foregoing that government policies have not effectively 
improved intertemporal elasticities, particularly in the recent years. The effectiveness of 
these policies in raising elasticities seems to have been offset by tax evasion. 
VI. Suggested tax reforms 
During the last two decades the tax system of Tanzania has undergone many reforms. 
Unfortunately, the reforms aimed largely at raising revenue have virtually failed to raise 
the revenue productivity of the tax system. However, the 1992 tax reform seems to have 
been a major one. The reform has reduced the rates of income tax, sales tax, import duty 
and excise duty. More important has been the removal of sales tax and import duty on 
capital goods and raw materials, and a substantial reduction of exemptions. It is still too 
early to measure the impact of the reform on compliance, etc. 
It has been demonstrated in this paper that the size of the underground economy is 
quite significant, which tends to erode the existing tax base. It is also evident that the 
measuring of revenue productivity using official GDP statistics tends to overestimate 
buoyancies and elasticities when the size of the underground economy is large. Conse-
quently, it is important to discuss the type of reforms that would penetrate the under-
ground economy. 
The reforms suggested here are those which may improve the revenue productiv-
ity. As mentioned earlier, the underground economy may be divided into three main 
categories: the parallel market; the informal sector; and the black market. The partici-
pants in these three are the most difficult to tax. The objective therefore should be to 
bring all the participants into the tax net. 
The major probable causes of tax evasion in Tanzania have been high tax rates that 
led to high tax bills or tax burdens. To avoid the heavy tax burden some potential and 
actual taxpayers have decided to go underground. 
The other possible cause of tax evasion is poor and inefficient tax administration. 
This has been attributable to lack of working facilities, inadequate office space and the 
low pay of employees of the tax departments. Low pay may possibly result in the tax 
collectors colluding with the tax payers to evade paying taxes. 
Thus the reforms that would penetrate the underground economy should obviously 
be the ones which will attempt to address the causes of tax evasion. First, despite the 
significant reduction of the rates of sales tax, import duty and excise duty, and the re-
moval of taxes on inputs, there is no guarantee that most activities in the underground 
economy will be brought into the tax net. A taxpayer is mainly interested in the total tax 
bill that he/she pays rather than in the tax rates. Although the tax rates have been re-
duced, the tax bill is still very high for most imported commodities due to the rapid 
depreciation of the shilling against foreign currencies. Thus, there is still a need to 
further reduce taxes on commodities to make the tax bill manageable. Participants in the 
underground economy will only come into the open when they consider the tax bill to be 
low enough to pay. 
Second, a reduction of the tax rates alone is not adequate. An efficient tax admin-
istration is necessary to enable the optimum collection of taxes. Most tax reforms in 
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developing countries (including Tanzania) have been reforms of the tax structure. Very 
few countries have had reforms of tax administration. Whatever a reform of tax struc-
ture is designed, if it is not accompanied by competent tax administration or administra-
tive reform, such a tax reform is bound to be useless. Accordingly, reform of tax admin-
istration can improve the efficiency of the administration and enable it to penetrate the 
underground economy. 
Third, to facilitate reform of tax administration, the staff in the tax departments 
should be equipped with working facilities, provided with reasonable office space and 
paid a living wage. The government should be willing to spend some money to enable it 
to collect more tax revenue since this can pay off. There is a certain level of expenditure 
on tax collection that can optimize revenue collection. The government need not behave 
as a profit maximizing or cost minimizing firm. Cost minimization by the government 
by way of paying tax collectors low pay, not providing them with adequate working 
facilities may be sub-optimal. Currently, the government spends less than 2% on col-
lecting total tax revenue. One would consider the tax system to be efficient since the 
collection cost is low. However, the cost is low because the taxes are collected under 
difficult working conditions. 
Fourth, one of the reasons why not enough tax revenue is collected is because the 
tax authorities look at faces in collecting taxes. To enhance tax collection this should be 
done away with. Those who are supposed to pay taxes should do so irrespective of their 
status in the society or their position in the ruling party or government. This type of 
reform requires serious government commitment. 
This points to the main problem of political acceptability of reforms. Politicians 
often seek to maximize votes in order to stay in politics. Vote maximization behaviour 
of politicians can lead to the problem of acceptability of reforms. Suppose policy-mak-
ers have designed a tax reform which if passed in the parliament and consequently imple-
mented, would enhance revenue collection. However, if politicians anticipate that pro-
posed reform is likely to be unpopular among the taxpayers (voters), then politicians 
may not have an incentive to support the proposed reform as this may cost them their 
votes. But even if such a reform is supported by politicians, it may still not be imple-
mented due to the pressures exerted by various pressure groups in the country on the 
government. For example, in 1992 a major tax reform was passed in the Parliament. 
The reform package included massive reduction of tax exemptions and removal of im-
port duties on imported inputs, among others. Nevertheless, these measures were short-
lived. After six months the government restored virtually all exemptions that it abol-
ished six months before due to pressure from parastatal enterprises, religious and chari-
table organizations, the ruling party, some donor agencies, and of course, the bureau-
crats. This is a clear indication that success of any tax reform requires strong govern-
ment commitment to reform. 
Finally, in the coming years, tax reforms should be directed towards real estate. 
Real estate stands out today as a potentially important tax base. Most of the demand for 
reform can be met if real estate is sufficiently taxed. But taxation of property in Tanza-
nia is very difficult and will remain so for sometime. Success in this area will also 
require serious government commitment. 
VII. Conclusion 
The objectives of this paper were: 1). to provide a theoretical discussion on the relation-
ship between buoyancy/elasticity and the existence of the underground economy; 2). to 
estimate buoyancies and elasticities using official GDP data and using a tax base inclu-
sive of the estimated income from the underground economy; 3). to provide an explana-
tory link between measured productivity and tax policies; and 4). to provide a brief 
discussion on what type of tax reforms could penetrate the underground economy. 
It is postulated in this study that there is an inverse relationship between buoyancy/ 
elasticity and the existence of the underground economy. That is, as the size of under-
ground economy grows, tax buoyancy/elasticity is expected to fall, and vice versa. This 
is because its growth erodes the tax base. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the empirical results. First, measuring 
buoyancy and elasticity based on official GDP data in an economy in which the size of 
the underground economy is significant tends to overestimate these measures of revenue 
productivity. Second, the size of these measures is influenced by tax policies in specific 
periods. There were lower rates/higher buoyancies in the 1970s and higher rates/lower 
buoyancies in the 1980s, a demonstration of a Laffer Curve. Finally, tax policies do 
affect intertemporal elasticities. 
These conclusions, however, must be qualified. The methods used to measure the 
underground economy in this study suffer from several drawbacks, which have already 
been pointed out. Yet in the absence of a perfect method of measurement the use of the 
Guttman method may be justified. 
Despite this qualification, these conclusions have important policy implications 
for tax reforms in a developing economy. First, policies aimed at enhancing revenue 
should focus on checking the growth of the underground economy, which erodes the tax 
base through tax evasion. Second, tax reform should concentrate on rationalizing rate 
reduction, broadening the base and improving tax administration. Finally, above all, the 
success of the reform calls for serious government commitment. 
Notes 
1. However, the 1992 tax reforms reduced income tax, sales tax, import duty and 
excise duty rates. For details see the Budget Speech for the 1992/93 fiscal year. 
2 . Certainly, some underground activities do not originate from taxes, thus estimates 
will not capture these activities. Computation, however, excluded the income 
generated from illegal activities from national accounts; it is likely that this in-
come would vanish if it was discovered and taxed. It should also be realized that 
the opportunity cost of the resources used for these activities is likely to be very 
low. 
3. See Osoro (1992) for a detail discussion of elasticities and buoyancies. 
4. See Judge, et al. (1980: p. 308-311) for a description of the Box-Cox model and its 
properties. 
5. Between 1975-77 coffee prices quadrupled, real GDP grew by 8.8%, and terms of 
trade improved by about one-third. 
6. The estimates of tax evasion relate only to that which is associated with currency 
use and underground activities. However, obviously, many forms of tax evasion 
(claiming nonexistent exemptions, exaggerating, deductions, non-reporting of in-
terest income received, etc.) have nothing to do with currency usage or under-
ground economic activities. Thus, these estimates do not measure total tax eva-
sion. 
7. For details of the description and estimation results of the model see Osoro and 
Leuthold (1992). 
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